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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent 
vs. 
RANDY SHEA GARDNER, 
Defendant / Petitioner 
Case No. 20060281-SC 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether due process necessitated review of the cross-examination 
testimony of one of the State's witnesses], where Petitioner claimed entrapment, 
the recorded transcript does not include the cross-examination testimony, and the 
court of appeals did not address the district court's proposed reconstruction of that 
testimony. 
On certiorari review, this Court examines the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the 
Petitioner's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Defendant and Petitioner, Randy Shea Gardner, appeals from the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming his conviction by a jury in Third 
District Court for Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consent or Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance (Metharnphetamine), a second degree felony, 
B. Lower Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Gardner was charged by Information with two (2) counts of Distribution, 
Offering, Agreement, Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled or 
Counterfeit Substance, a Second Degree Felony, at Utah State Prison, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (R. 1-3). A Preliminary Hearing was held on 
April 2, 2002 after which the trial court bound Gardner over on both charges, and 
Gardner entered pleas of not guilty (R. 294). 
Prior to trial, Gardner, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on 
grounds of entrapment (R. 59-68). A motion hearing was held on December 13, 
2002 (R. 288). The trial court heard testimony in regards to the entrapment 
motion. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on grounds of entrapment (R. 
2 
288: 107-110). On January 13, 2003, the court issued its written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 119-22). 
A jury trial was held on February 26-28, 2003 after which the jury rendered 
a verdict of guilty as to Count One (1) Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consent 
or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a second 
degree felony; and a verdict of not guilty as to Count Two (2), Distribution, 
Offering, Agreeing, Consent or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance 
(Heroin), a second degree felony (R. 279, 291: 402). At trial the jury was 
instructed on the defense of entrapment (Jury Instructions nos. 32 and 33) (R. 21 L 
212-13). 
Gardner, who was incarcerated during the pendency of this case and trial, 
was sentenced on April 22, 2003, to a consecutive term of one (1) to fifteen (15) 
years in the Utah State Prison to the commitment he was already serving (R. 292). 
Gardner is presently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. The notice of appeal 
was filed on April 28, 2003 (R. 281). 
On appeal, Gardner filed a motion for summary7 reversal because the cross-
examination portion of Leland Clark's testimony was not recorded. On March 23, 
2005, the Court of Appeals denied the motion but remanded the matter to Third 
District Court for a determination of whether the record could adequately be 
reconstructed. 
On September 30, 2004, the Third District Court held a hearing on 
reconstructing the missing trial testimony (R. 298). The district court continued 
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the matter to allow counsel an opportunity to figure out the problem with the tapes 
(R.298:4). 
On November 9, 2004, a second reconstruction hearing was held in district 
court (R. 297). At the hearing, defense counsel Wall stated that the missing 
portion of the testimony was the most significant part because the defense was 
attempting to establish at trial that there was an entrapment. Waifs perception was 
that he fully and completely met all of the elements of an entrapment. 
Wall further stated that during the cross-examination, he recalled the 
witness stating that he had urged the defendant to engage in the unlawful conduct. 
However, the prosecutor, Cope, recalled that the witness was given four words to 
select from and that he selected the word "urge" (R. 297: 5). Wall submitted that 
there would be an unclear record as to what in fact occurred at trial and whether or 
not the elements were fully met (R. 297: 5). 
Cope argued that Gardner was not prejudiced, because even if there was no 
record of what the jury heard, the jury heard all the testimony and they deliberated 
upon all the facts that were presented to them (R. 297: 11). Cope felt that he could 
reconstruct Waifs cross-examination of the witness to a certain extent. 
On December 21, 2004, a final reconstruction hearing was held in district 
court (R. 296). The trial court concluded that with Cope's reconstruction using the 
available testimony that the record could be satisfactorily reconstructed (R. 296: 
5). The trial court further found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the 
incomplete record (R. 296: 6). 
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On January 26, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an unpublished, per 
curiam decision affirming Gardner's convictions. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the record was complete enough to determine that the State 
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Gardner acted freely and 
voluntarily, and was not entrapped into committing the offense. State v. Gardner, 
not reported in P.3d, 2005 UT App 21, (Utah App. 2006) (included herein in the 
Addenda; for easy reference paragraph numbers have been added to the copy of 
the court of appeals' decision). The Court of Appeals also concluded, citing State 
v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App. 1996), that a defendant is not entitled to 
a new trial whenever a gap in the record exists just in case the gap may contain 
some error. Id. at1! 4. 
Gardner filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari with this Court which 
was ultimately granted. A copy of this Court's order granting that petition is 
included in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A, Testimony from the Jury Trial 
1. Testimony of Leland Harris Clark 
Clark, a fellow prisoner at the Utah State Prison and a friend of Gardner's, 
testified that Gardner talked with him about bringing drugs into the prison through 
a med tech friend of Gardner's (R. 289:109-111,115). Clark said that Gardner 
told him that he had pills delivered to himself a couple of times but that he did not 
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have a connection who could supply the drugs and he couldn't talk the guy into 
doing it (R. 289:115). Clark said he reported this information to investigator 
Pepper "because it was against the law." (R. 289:114-1 16). Clark told Pepper that 
the med tech friend worked in their section delivering medications and told Pepper 
where he lived (R. 289:116). 
Clark testified that he received instructions from investigator Pepper to 
have Gardner call the phone number Pepper gave Clark, and tell Gardner that this 
was the number of Clark's connection to get some drugs or have them brought in 
(R. 289:118-119). 
Clark testified he gave the number to Gardner, who called it using Clark's 
prison PIN number, and then told Clark he talked to the connection about getting 
cocaine and heroin and that he was excited about it, that it sounded like it was 
going to be a good deal (R. 289:119-120). Clark told Gardner he would help him 
sell (R. 289 at 120). 
Clark also testified that Gardner told him after the phone call that he was 
trying to get it lined up with the med tech to call Pepper as the connection and that 
the med tech was on Gardner's prison calling list and that he had been calling him 
(R. 289:121). Clark testified that he believed Gardner spoke with the med tech's 
wife and that he was having a hard time persuading him, and it took him a couple 
of times over a week or two to get things lined up (R. 289:121). Clark thought 
Gardner made five or six calls total between investigator Pepper and the med tech 
and/or his wife (R. 289:122). 
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Clark testified that Gardner told him the med teeh was poor and that it 
probably would only be a one time thing if the med tech did it because he was 
having money problems (R. 289:124). Clark stated Gardner told him that the med 
tech was definitely scared but that he was interested, seeing it as a potential to 
make some money (R. 289:124). Clark also said that he had no knowledge of the 
med tech bringing in coke or heroin before, but only prescription drugs (R. 289: 
124). Clark also testified that Gardner told him that the med tech and investigator 
Pepper did talk on the phone at some point but that Clark was not sure who called 
whom (R. 289:125). 
2. Testimony of Donald Peter Buckley, Jr. 
Buckley was employed at the Utah State Prison as a medic beginning in 
October 2000 (R. 289:130-131). A couple months after beginning work, Buckley 
ran across Randy (Shea) Gardner while doing the •'pill line," or dispensing 
prescribed medications to the inmates (R. 289:130-131). 
On February 18th Buckley believes, he received a call from Gardner after 
working a 24 hour shift (R. 289:141). During said conversation, Buckley vaguely 
remembers talk of a manila envelope (R. 289:142). 
Later in the evening on February 18th, Buckley made a call to Gardner's 
contact and asked him what the job was (R. 289:143). Buckley believed the 
person's name was Kevin (R. 289 at 143). Kevin proceeded to tell him that it was 
a delivery job, delivering drugs into the prison, specifically methamphetamine (R. 
n 
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289:143). Buckley told Kevin that he was not willing to risk his EMT 
certification, his house, or his family to do that (R. 289:143). 
When Buckley saw Gardner, during pill line, a day or two after the phone 
call with Kevin, he basically told him the same thing - that there was no way 
possible that he was going to put his job or family in jeopardy (R. 289:144). 
3. Testimony of Kevin ML Pepper 
In 2001, Kevin M. Pepper (Pepper) was working undercover at the Utah 
State Prison on a case against Gardner and no other cases (R. 290:167). In late 
2000, Pepper received word that Clark, a prisoner, wanted to see him (R. 290:169-
70). On January 10, 2001, after knowing Clark had wanted to see him for se\eral 
weeks, Pepper met with Clark (R. 290:170-72). Clark wanted to discuss with 
Pepper contraband coming into the prison and mentioned Gardner and an EMT 
named Don who did the pill line (R. 290:171). Pepper instructed Clark to keep his 
eyes and ears open while he attempted to verify some of the information Clark had 
given him (R. 290:172). 
During this initial conversation, Clark told Pepper that Don, the EMI, was 
friends with Gardner and had been for some time, and that he was bringing 
contraband into the prison (R. 290:175). Clark said that Gardner wanted to find a 
source to get some dope to bring into the prison or have brought into the prison (R. 
290:175). 
On January 18th, 2001, Pepper had Clark transported off the property to 
further inquire about the investigation and sign him up as an informant (R. 290: 
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181). During this meeting, Pepper instructed Clark about how he wanted the case 
to proceed (R. 290:182). Specifically, he wanted Clark to provide to Gardner his 
undercover name, Kevin Gilmore, and have Gardner contact him using Clark's 
PIN number (R. 290:182). Pepper came up with this plan and these were the only 
instructions given to Clark; they were never changed (R. 290:182, 184). 
4. Testimony of Randy Shea Gardner 
Gardner denied ever arranging or planning to bring controlled substances 
into the prison on or about February 12th, 2001 (R. 291:281). On the 28th or 29th of 
January, after hearing Gardner talking with his friend about the financial 
devastation of med-tech Buckley, Clark asked Gardner if he thought his friend 
would be interested in some help on how to get out of financial devastation (R. 
291:282). Clark told Gardner that he had a friend who had numerous connections 
to money through businesses or self money, who was pretty financially stable and 
in a position to help other people through a loan or a possible job (R. 291:283). 
Gardner asked Clark if he thought maybe his friend could make a loan or 
recommend a job. Gardner thought maybe the guy had a salvage yard or 
something like that for his friend to get a job (R. 291:283). 
Clark then provided Gardner with the names of Kevin and Jackie Gilmore 
and told him to have Buckley get a hold of them or pass his phone number to 
Buckley or Buckley's phone number to Kevin (R. 291:283). 
Gardner then wrote a letter to Buckley to tell him of a possible way for him 
to get out of financial devastation and that he would get ahold of him in the future 
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and pass the information along (R. 291:284). After Gardner wrote the first letter, 
he talked to Clark who gave him Kevin's phone number and an address (R. 291: 
284). Gardner then wrote to Buckley to give him the number and address (R. 291 : 
284). 
On February 12lh, Clark provided Gardner with his inmate PIN number on a 
piece of paper as well as Kevin's home phone number and Gardner went to the 
phone to call him (R. 291:285). After the phone call Gardner went and talked to 
Clark for a few minutes and then went to take a shower (R. 291:285). Gardner 
said he called Kevin to find out his information and to give him Buckley's phone 
number so they could get together to talk about the job (R. 291:285). Gardner 
stated that during the conversation with Kevin things went "a little out of the way I 
thought they were going to go" (R. 291:285). Kevin started talking about other 
stuff other than the job (R. 291:285). During this conversation, Gardner went 
along with the comments Kevin was making because Clark had told him that his 
friend was the kind of person they really wanted to keep happy, appease him, so 
Gardner construed that to mean Kevin was important or somebody that has 
influence somewhere (R. 291:286). Gardner went to talk to Clark about it and 
Clark told him, wThis is something that me and Kevin are doing on the side. It has 
nothing to do with you. I'll talk to him and leave you out of further conversation 
like this" (R. 291:285). 
Gardner also talked to Buckley about contacting this Kevin and told 
Buckley he wasn't really sure what it was about but that uto my knowledge, 
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there's going to be a manila envelope with some money involved" (R. 291:288). 
In response to why he said that, Gardner stated, "Leiand (Clark) Irad - Leiand had 
brought up a manila envelope to me along the lines of when we were talking. I 
went and asked him about ounces and black and white. And I had brought up in 
the manila envelope in a conversation earlier, when I had spoke with Kevin and 
Leiand had told me, Just tell him to use a manila envelope" (R. 291:288). Gardner 
wasn't sure how this manila envelope was going to be involved (R. 291:289). 
Gardner was concerned about what would happen if he did something 
contrary to the circumstances that Clark and Kevin put him in (R. 291:290). He 
was afraid due to Kevin's comments about not wanting him to get in trouble, or 
his "ass in a jam" and the recent stabbing and having been jumped at the prison 
once before and perhaps someone having friends to retaliate against him (R. 291: 
290-91). 
Gardner then talked to Clark, and told him he had just talked to Buckley, 
and reminded him again to get ahold of Kevin (R. 291:291). During the phone 
conversations, Kevin's mention of his plans to go to New York gave Gardner the 
impression that Kevin was some big shot who had connections in New York and 
made him want to placate him a little more (R. 291:292). Gardner also got the 
impression not that Kevin was trying to impress him, but that he was trying to let 
him know, "Don't screw me over" (R. 291:293). 
Gardner testified that Clark asked him almost daily about whether he had 
received a response from Buckley and that as the time passed with no response 
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from Buckley that Clark became more agitated, more irritable towards Gardner, 
and they went from hanging out every day to Clark only talking to him once in a 
great while, that Clark started avoiding him (R. 291:303). Gardner stated that 
Clark's language changed from pleasant conversation to more aggressive and 
hostile, emphasizing the need to get ahold of Buckley and get it taken care of (R. 
291:303). 
B. Testimony from the Motion Hearing regarding Entrapment 
1- Testimony of Leland Harris Clark ("Jazzman") 
Clark is an inmate at the Utah Department of Corrections and was an 
inmate in February of 2001 (R. 288:25). Clark has known Kevin Pepper since 
August of 2000 (R. 288:25). During the latter part of January, 2001, Clark gave 
information to Pepper about a somewhat close friend of Gardner who was a nied-
tech and was bringing dope in and could bring dope in (R. 288:27). Clark testified 
that initially he got information from his own observations of things going on in 
the prison, then he nosed around and eventually Gardner told him what was going 
on (R. 288:27). Clark testified that Gardner told him that it started when Gardner 
and his cell-mate were getting pills from the med-tech, because the med-tcch's 
wife was like Gardner's sister - they grew up together (R. 288:27). 
Clark testified that Gardner told him about things that had already 
happened and things that were going on right then (R. 288:27). Clark testified that 
he shared all of this information with Pepper (R. 288:28). Clark testified that 
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Pepper instructed him to keep him posted and let him know what was going on 
and if Gardner had anything planned and what was going to come in (R. 288:28). 
In exchange for this information, Clark proposed that Pepper provide him with a 
letter to the Board of Pardons for consideration and a transfer to another facility 
(R. 288:28). Clark also required "[hjousing ... and a time cur (R. 288:28). 
Clark testified that from the end of January until the end of February he 
talked to Pepper close to ten or fifteen times about things he had heard or things 
that he knew from Gardner (R. 288:28). During the same timeframe, he talked to 
Gardner every day - they were out on the same recreation schedule and li\ ed two 
or three cells from each other (R. 288:29). 
Clark testified that Gardner said that "he didn't have any connections as far 
as drugs, you know, but he'd like to get some lined up because, you know, if we 
could work something out as a partnership, if I could get the dope lined up, he 
could - he could have it brought in and we both could make some good money" 
(R. 288:29). Clark indicated to Gardner that he could do that (R. 288:29). Clark 
then talked to Pepper about it and they planned to have Clark give Pepper's phone 
number to Gardner as Clark's drug connection (R. 288:30). Clark did not tell 
Gardner that his "connection" worked for the Utah State Prison system. Instead he 
let him believe that Pepper was his connection for drugs on the streets and that he 
wanted to get something into the prison to make some money himself (R. 288:30). 
Clark testified that he did not recall making any specific promises to 
Gardner about how much money he could make or how lucrative it was to do this, 
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he just remembered that the partnership was 50-50 (R. 288:30). Clark testified 
that he talked to Gardner about how much money it was possible to make in such 
an endeavor, but he did not recall the numbers (R. 288:31). 
Clark was asked if he urged, encouraged, or pressured Gardner to 
participate in this enterprise and Clark answered that he urged him. Clark told 
Gardner that he could make him some money, too. Gardner told Clark that the 
med-tech was about to lose his house and he wanted to do it one or two times 
because he wanted to do something to help him (R. 288:31). Gardner also told 
Clark that he wanted to transfer out-of-state, possibly to Washington. Clark told 
him he wanted to get some money for transfer, too (R. 288:31). 
Clark testified that Gardner reported to him several times about the 
conversations he had with Pepper. Gardner indicated that it sounded good and that 
he was going to work try to put him in touch with the med-tech (R. 288:32). 
Clark's impression was that Gardner was enthusiastic about the prospects 
(R. 288:32). Clark never indicated to Gardner that any negative things would 
happen if he did not go through with the deal (R. 288:32). Clark testified that both 
he and Gardner were nervous about selling dope inside prison (R. 288:32). Both 
of their fears centered around getting caught (R. 288:33). 
Clark recalled that the last time he spoke to Gardner about the enterprise 
was in February of 2001 (R. 288:33). Clark was transferred at the end of February 
and the last conversation with Gardner took place within a day or the same day of 
the transfer (R. 288:33). During the last conversation with Gardner, Clark testified 
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that they talked about "trying to get it lined up or he was - Mr. Pepper was calling 
the med-tech on the street, was supposed to line that up - could talk to the - or Mr. 
Gardner talk to the med-tech and told him that my connection was going to call 
him and talk to him and line things upv (R. 288:34). Clark testified that the name 
of the med-tech was uDon" (R. 288:34) and he saw "Don" five days a week when 
he came into their section and delivered pills (R. 288:34). 
Clark testified that he had first been sentenced to prison in 1989 for writing 
bad checks or fraud. Clark admitted that fraud is lying. Clark testified that he had 
been in prison probably eight years since 1989, but that it wasn't continuous (R. 
288:35). Clark testified that he was sentenced in January of 1999 for attempted 
security fraud and that is why he was in prison in February of 2001(R. 288:35). 
Clark wanted to be transferred out of state because he knew that this enterprise 
was going to have some ramifications and being in the population would be a little 
rough (R. 288:37). 
At the time, Clark was not talking to Pepper about any other inmates (R. 
288:37). Clark did not recall intercepting and delivering to Pepper "kites"' from 
any prisoner other than Gardner (R. 288:37). Clark did not remember the specific 
month that he began being housed with Gardner, just that it had been some time 
the previous year (R. 288:37). Clark agreed that the dates September of 1999 to 
January 5, 2001 were about right (R. 288:38). Clark testified that Gardner went to 
another unit to live for a while and then he came back within a month of this 
incident (R. 288:38). 
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Clark testified that he had been talking with Pepper regarding Gardner prior 
to the time that Gardner was taken out of the unit and it was during that time that 
he became aware of the relationship between Gardner and Buckley, the med-lech. 
Clark informed Pepper of the relationship and that Buckley was giving contraband 
material to Gardner prior to leaving the unit in January (R. 288:39). Clark did not 
observe the transfer of contraband, he was told about it from Gardner (R. 288:40). 
Clark testified that a "kite" is a slip of paper passed between prisoners 
facilitating communication. Clark testified that he did not recall intercepting any 
"kites" from Gardner, but he did receive some "kites" from Gardner and passed 
them on to Pepper (R. 288:40). Clark testified that he understood after his 
conversation with Pepper about the benefits he wanted to receive that he would 
need to provide further information to Pepper in order to get all of the benefits he 
wanted (R. 288:41). 
Clark had discussions with Gardner, prior to his removal in January of 
2001, about his relationship with Buckley (R. 288:41). Clark was aware of the 
close relationship between Gardner and Buckley's wife from January of 2000 to 
the time that Gardner was removed from the unit in January of 2001 (R. 288:42). 
Clark knew that the close relationship had gone on for many years and that the 
Buckley family was having economic difficulty, could not meet his monthly bills, 
and was considering bankruptcy (R. 288:42). Clark knew from his conversations 
with Gardner that Gardner was very concerned about Buckley's situation (R. 
288:43). Clark did not know that Gardner had a girlfriend (R. 288:43). 
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Clark testified that some time in January of 2001, Gardner was removed for 
a short period of time from the unit he was in with Clark. Gardner was then 
returned to the unit. When he returned, Clark was aware that arrangements were 
going to be made through Pepper for telephone calls to be made (R. 288:45). 
Clark testified that it is his understanding that prison officials determine where 
people live in the units of the Utah State Prison and it was through the prison 
officials that Gardner was returned to the same unit Clark was in (R. 288:46). 
Clark knew that his conversations with Pepper were tape recorded, but he never 
saw any written reports that Pepper had made about their conversations (R. 
288:46). The conversations occurred on the unit phone and Clark was aware that 
the unit phones could be recorded (R. 288:47). 
Clark urged Gardner to get involved in this arrangement with Pepper (R. 
288:47). 
Clark stated that Gardner came to him excited about making money and he 
just encouraged him and told him it would be great. They talked about it every 
day - the kind of money there was to make, their connection for the drugs, and 
somebody to bring it in (R. 288:48). Clark had to tell Gardner that Pepper was 
available in order to make the money and Clark initiated the conversation with 
Gardner about "Kevin" being out there to provide money. Clark referred to 
"Kevin" as a Mr. Moneybags and indicated that this person was worth millions of 
dollars and was "extremely well-heeled" (R. 288:48). Clark indicated to Gardner 
that "Kevin" could give him a job whereby he could make a lot of money. Clark 
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then used the information he had about Gardner's relationship with Buckley's wife 
and their bankruptcy situation to develop an avenue whereby this whole 
transaction could occur (R. 288:50). 
Clark provided Gardner with the telephone number for '"Kevin" after Clark 
and Pepper had actually talked about how the particular structure for this 
transaction would be put in place (R. 288:51). 
For his participation, Clark was transferred out of state and he received a 
letter to the Board and is just waiting for some court proceedings to get his time 
cut (R. 288:51). Clark's current release date is June of 2006. Clark has been 
convicted of over 10 felonies. Not all the convictions are fraud. His convictions 
include bad checks, theft burglary, embezzlement (R. 288:52). 
Clark had never spoken to Deputy District Attorney Cope prior to this 
hearing and all of his communication about this case had been with Pepper. Clark 
never had any contact with Buckley about this deal. Clark reported to Pepper 
what Gardner told him and he never exaggerated, embellished, or made up details 
(R. 288:54). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which protect 
individuals from any governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property with the 
due process of law, applies to the appellate process. Because Utah has passed 
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legislation regarding the recording of criminal proceedings, it is bound to apply 
that legislation in accordance with the requirements of due process. 
While a complete, verbatim record of all court proceedings may not be 
compulsory, decisions from the United States Supreme Court as well as this Court 
imply that it must be a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper 
consideration of the appellant's claims. 
Where, as here, the cross-examination testimony of the witness most 
critical to the establishment of a defendant's affirmative defense is not recorded, 
fundamental fairness demands that a defendant not be required to pursue his 
appeal while hobbled by an incomplete record. 
Due process is a flexible concept based on the concept of fairness, and 
"should afford the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands/" 
Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, f 15, 103 P.3d 130, 134 (Utah 2004) 
(citations omitted). Because Gardner's claims of trial error cannot be adequately 
reviewed without Clark's cross-examination testimony, fundamental fairness and 
due process demands that he be granted a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
Due Process Requires That Gardner Be Granted A New Trial Where The 
Recorded Transcript Does Not Include The Cross-Examination Testimony Of 
The Critical Witness To Gardner's Entrapment Defense, Because Gardner 
Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To Meaningful Appellate Review 
Notions of fundamental fairness are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which "prohibit[] any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 48 K 92 S.Ct. 
2593, 2600 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has applied this guarantee 
under a two-step analysis, addressing first "whether the asserted individual 
interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection ol iife, 
liberty or property," and second "what procedures constitute cdue process of 
law.'" Id. 
Here, the individual interest concerned is that most basic American 
concept, liberty - specifically, the deprivation thereof consequent to a criminal 
conviction. Thus, the question before this Court requires a determination of those 
procedures due a criminal defendant in pursuing an appellate review of his 
conviction when part of the trial transcript is missing. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the guarantee of due 
process extends to the appellate process. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392, 
105 S.Ct 830, 834, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (Where "a State has created appellate 
courts as 'an integral part of the ... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or 
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innocence of a defendant," ... the procedures used in deciding appeals must 
comport with the demands of the Due Process and Rqual Protection Clauses of the 
Constitution," quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 1 8, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 
L.Bd. 891 (1956)). 
The district courts of Utah are courts of record. Utah Const, art. VI IK §1; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-l-l(l),(2), 78-1-2 (1987). As such, a record of all its 
official proceedings are to be made. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-105 (1997) {see 
Addenda). Judges "are required to make a record of the proceedings they 
conduct. Ordinarily, the record consists of a verbatim transcription or recording of 
the entire proceeding:" Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644. 649 (Utah App. 1995) 
(emphasis added). Having established a statutory requirement for ihe recording 
of court proceedings, Utah courts should be bound to apply that requirement 
fairly and uniformly. While a verbatim record may not be required, it should be 
"a 'record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper consideration of the 
appellant's claims." Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193, 92 S.Ct. 410, 
414, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971), quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S 487. 496, 
83 S.Ct. 774, 779, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963). "Generally, a record is adequate if it 
permits appellate review" Liska, supra, 902 P.2d at 649 fn. 6 (emphasis added). 
While the focus of the Supreme Court's decisions cited above addressed 
providing transcripts to indigent appellants, the language used is at least 
instructive. In Griffin, for example, a decision on the merits of the appeal was 
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necessarily dependent upon a sufficient transcript of the trial court proceedings. 
See 351 U.S. at 13-14, 76 S.Ct. at 588. 
Utah cases that have approached the issue presented by the instant case 
include State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 (Utah 2000) and State v. Taylor, 
664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). In the former, the videotape of the second day of the 
defendant's trial could not be located and was therefore not transcribed for the 
record. Tunzi, 998 P.2d at f2, 817. This Court ordered a new trial, observing that 
'"attempts to reconstruct major portions of records often prove to be futile because 
such reconstructions often fail to provide the detail necessary to resolve the issues 
on appeal. The burdens and futility associated with reconstructing a record are 
increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a conviction, as it does here." Id. at ^3. 
Similarly, in Taylor, this Court ordered a new trial in a case challenging the 
adequacy of the trial court's jury voir dire because the audiotaped questioning had 
a number of inaudible responses. Taylor. 664 P.2d at 445-447, In so ordering, 
this Court noted that it could not assume what the jurors" answers showed when 
they were "totally absent from the record and c[ould] not be reconstructed by 
agreement of the parties." Id. at 447. 
While neither Tunzi nor Taylor addressed the due process implications of 
an incomplete or inadequate record, this Court nevertheless implied that a 
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meaningful appeal could not be accomplished absent a record that sufficiently 
memorialized the issue presented. 
This Court has also found plain error when a trial court fails to enter 
statutorily mandated written findings, reasoning that "only when such steps are 
taken can this Court properly perform its appellate review function." State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996), quoting State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 
1356 n. 3 (Utah 1986); see also State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert 
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d (1989); State v. Matsamas, 808 
P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah 1991). Again, implicit in this line of cases is the 
assumption that a meaningful appeal can only be accomplished with enough of a 
record to review the appellant's claims. 
Utah's Court of Appeals has explicitly held that the government's 
"improper recording and maintenance of the ... record is a due process violation in 
that it deprived [appellants] of their right to a meaningful review." West Valley 
City v.Roberts, 1999 UT App. 358, f7, 993 P.2d 252, 255 (Utah App. 1999) 
(audiotape malfunction at housing code hearing necessitated a new hearing, 
despite presence of documentary evidence). In another case, an equipment 
malfunction resulted in a failure to record almost two hours of the appellant's 
criminal trial. State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 558 (Utah App. 1996). Though the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with the observation that Taylor "does 
not require a complete record so appellate counsel can go fishing for error; it only 
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requires that there be a record adequate to review specific claims of error already 
raised," Russell, 917 P.2d at 559, the court found the case to be "troubling": 
It seems unfair that the great majority of convicted 
defendants have the luxury of searching the record for error, 
while an unfortunate few who encounter equipment snafus or 
lost reporter's notes must rely only upon the memories and 
notes of those present to reconstruct what happened and what 
errors might have been made. Additionally, this rule ma> tend 
to promote disingenuousness on the part of appellate counsel. 
Case law suggests if there are numerous alleged mistakes, a 
new trial must be held unless the entire record can be 
satisfactorily reconstructed. 
Id. at 559, n. 1. Yet, despite its professed concern with "the unfortunate 
few who encounter equipment snafus," Id., the Court of Appeals in this case did 
not even consider the attempted reconstruction it had ordered. The Court of 
Appeals, in affirming Gardner's conviction, found that 4wthe record on appeal is 
complete enough to determine whether Gardner freely and voluntarily committed 
the acts in question because the State's case-in-chief is complete and the missing 
testimony would, at most, be inconsistent or contrary evidence." State v. Gardner, 
2005 UT App 21,^5. This conclusion begs the question: despite the 
"completeness" of the State's case against Gardner, the entrapment defense is a 
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factor tending to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant freely and voluntarily 
committed the offense charged. See State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 
1975) ("the only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be sufficient 
to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant freely and voluntarily committed the 
crime"). 
Because Gardner's entrapment defense relied heavily on Clark's testimony 
and because Gardner's trial counsel perceived that he had elicited testimony 
establishing entrapment on cross-examination (R. 304-305), a review of Clark's 
cross-examination was critical to a fair determination of issues presented by 
Gardner's appeal. This is especially so where defense counsel observed that the 
trial had produced "additional evidence that was not heard at the motion hearing" 
on the entrapment issue (R. 290:280). Again, the Court of Appeals could not have 
meaningfully reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence or the correctness of the 
trial court's denial of the motion for a directed verdict absent the primary evidence 
introduced on entrapment. In completely disregarding the import of Clark's cross-
examination testimony, the Court of Appeals effectively reduced Gardner's 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him to a mere formality. 
Other states have considered and determined that a sufficiently complete 
record is necessary to a meaningful appellate review. See, e g., People of the State 
of Colorado v. Killpack, 793 P.2d 642, 643 (Colo.App. 1990) ("When testimony 
this crucial [addressing defendant's mental state] is in dispute and the precise 
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language used is critical, reconstruction is not an appropriate remedy for the 
missing transcript. ...While we agree that loss of a portion of the complete trial 
record does not automatically require reversal, nonetheless, when a defendant can 
show that the incomplete record "visits a hardship upon [the appellant] and 
prejudices his appeal" reversal is proper," internal citation omitted); People of the 
State of New York v. Hussari, 17 A.D.3d 483, 794 N.Y.S.2d 64 (NY 2005) 
("When fca record cannot be reconstructed because of the lapse of time, the 
unavailability of the participants in the proceeding or some similar circumstance, 
there must be a reversal,'" internal citations omitted); State ofLoasiana v. 
AmbeaiL 930 So.2d 54, 59 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2006)CvMaterial omissions from the 
transcript of the proceedings at trial bearing on the merits of an appeal require 
reversal"); State of North Carolina v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 320. 321 S.E.2d 836 
(N.C. 1984) (because "meaningful appellate review of the serious questions 
presented by defendant's appeal is completely precluded by the entirely inaccurate 
and inadequate transcription of the trial proceedings and that no adequate record 
can be formulated," judgment is vacated and new trial ordered); State of 
Washington v. Thomas, 70 Wn.App. 296, 298, 852 P.2d 1130 (1993); United 
States v. Brown-Austin, 34 M.J. 578, 582 (ACMR 1992) (while a "verbatim 
transcript is not constitutionally required for appellate review, ... [tjhe government 
has the burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice which results when there 
is substantial omission from the record"). 
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In the instant case, the State's key witness and confidential informant, 
Leland Clark, was cross-examined at trial regarding his status as an agent for the 
government; his formulation, with Officer Pepper, of a plan to bring drugs into the 
prison, which he then "urged" Gardner to follow, and Gardner's close living 
proximity to Clark during this sequence of events (R. 304-305). Gardner's trial 
counsel also offered the observation that Clark's testimony differed notably from 
the pretrial evidentiary hearing (R. 304-305). Defense counsel's memory of this 
cross-examination contrasts significantly from that of the prosecutor (R. 300-302). 
This cross-examination testimony went unrecorded and therefore was not 
transcribed (289:127). Because this testimony, if it occurred as defense counsel 
remembered it, would have established the defense of entrapment, there can be no 
meaningful review of Gardner's claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence 
against him, the denial of his motion to dismiss on grounds of entrapment, or the 
correctness of the jury instructions given regarding entrapment. 
Due process, a flexible concept "based on the concept of fairness, should 
afford the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands.5" Low, supra, 
2004 UT 90 at \\5 (citations omitted). Because Gardner's claims of trial error 
cannot be adequately reviewed without Clark's cross-examination testimony, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 provides: "It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or 
a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for 
prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment." 
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fundamental fairness and due process demands that he be granted a new trial. 
This is particularly true where his constitutional rights to confrontation are 
likewise implicated. Accordingly, because this Court cannot conclude that the 
absence of the critical cross-examination testimony from the record is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt to meaningful and necessary appellate review, this 
Court should reverse Gardner's conviction. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 
250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 
U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1058,31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1912); see also Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Hartford, 
737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because Gardner was deprived meaningful appellate review due to the 
absence of that testimony most critical to Gardner's entrapment defense, clue 
process requires that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this matter to 
the Third District Court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of September, 2006, 
Julia Thomas 
Margaret Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered lour (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 18,h day of 
September, 2006. 
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ADDENDA 
30 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303: It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into 
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person 
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-105: Record of court proceedings-Duties of court 
reporter 
(1) The Judicial Council shall by rule provide for the means of maintaining 
the record of proceedings in the courts of record by official court reporters 
or by electronic recording devices. 
(2) The official court reporter assigned to a session of court shall take full 
verbatim stenographic notes of the session, except when the judge 
dispenses with the verbatim record. 
(3) The official court reporter shall immediately file with the clerk of the 
court the original stenographic notes of the court session and the computer 
disk on which the notes are stored. If not already on file with the clerk of 
the court, the official court reporter shall file a computer disk containing the 
reporters most current dictionary showing the meaning of the reporter's 
stenographic notes. 
(4) Upon request and the payment of fees established by Section 78-56-108, 
the official court reporter shall transcribe the stenographic notes or video or 
audio recording of the court session and furnish the transcript to the 
requesting party. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
^A *1 Randy Shea Gardner appeals his conviction of 
arranging for the distribution of a controlled 
substance. He asserts that his conviction should be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial 
because the record is insufficient for a meaningful 
appeal. He also argues that a jury instruction was in 
error. 
A « Criminal defendants have the right to a "record of 
sufficient completeness to permit proper 
consideration of [their] claims." State v. Menzies, 
845 P.2d 220, 241 (Utah 1992) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). They do not, however, have a 
right to a perfect transcript. See id. Rather, the 
record must be adequate to allow meaningful 
judicial review. See id. 
\^ "Due process requires that there be a record 
adequate to review specific claims of error already 
raised." West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 
358, H II, 993 P.2d 252 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). Appellate courts will not presume 
error where a record is incomplete. See id. A lack of 
a complete record will be a "basis for remand and a 
new hearing only where: (I) the absence or 
incompleteness of the record prejudices the 
appellant; (2) the record cannot be satisfactorily 
reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other 
documentary evidence); and, (3) the appellant 
timely requests the relevant portion of the record.11 
Id 
A y An incomplete record may necessitate a new trial 
* where a defendant shows that a specific error is 
asserted and that the missing record was critical to 
its resolution. See State v Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 
559 (Utah Ct.App.1996). A defendant is not entitled 
to a new trial whenever there is a gap in the record, " 
just in case the missing record might reveal some 
error." Id. Rather, a showing of prejudice is 
required. See id. Gardner has not shown that the gap 
in the record has prejudiced him. 
I^£- Gardner asserts that the record on appeal is 
inadequate to determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He 
argues that the absence of the cross-examination 
testimony of Leland Clark means that this court 
cannot review whether there was sufficient evidence 
to show the "lack of entrapment." However, the 
record on appeal is complete enough to determine 
whether Gardner freely and voluntarily committed 
the acts in question because the State's case-in-chief 
is complete and the missing testimony would, at 
most, be inconsistent or contrary evidence. 
&(z A conviction may be overturned for insufficiency of 
evidence only "when it is apparent that there is not 
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of 
the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 13, 25 
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P.3d 985 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Moreover, "li]t is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses." Id. at f 16. "When 
reviewing a trial wherein conflicting competent 
evidence was presented, we simply "assume that the 
jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." ' 
Id. at U 14 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1213 (Utah 1993)). Ultimately, in determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, "so long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. 
" M a t ^ 16. 
*2 The record is complete enough to determine that 
the State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to 
find that Gardner acted freely and voluntarily, and 
was not entrapped into committing the offense. The 
evidence showed that Gardner initiated the plan of 
bringing drugs into the prison, lacking only an 
outside supplier. Gardner demonstrated his 
willingness to participate in this enterprise. Kevin 
Pepper provided Gardner the opportunity to commit 
the offense by posing as an outside supplier, with 
Clark passing on certain contact information to 
Gardner. The phone conversations between Gardner 
and Pepper show no hesitation or confusion from 
Gardner in participating in a drug distribution 
agreement. 
Even assuming that Clark's cross-examination 
testimony supported Gardner's defense that he was 
entrapped into committing the offense due to 
concern for his own safety and concern for a 
friend's financial circumstances, the testimony 
would present only inconsistent evidence, which the 
jury obviously chose not to believe. There is 
testimony from Clark stating that Gardner initiated 
the idea of bringing drugs into prison, and 
testimony from Pepper regarding the further 
arrangements. Where conflicting evidence is 
presented at trial, appellate courts "simply assume 
that the jury believed the evidence supporting the 
verdict." Id. at Tj 14 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). Given the evidence supporting the 
verdict, the presumption is that the jury simply did 
not give any significant weight to any possible 
testimony from Clark that would have supported 
**1 
4io 
entrapment. As a result, Gardner has not shown any 
prejudice due to the missing portion of the record. 
Gardner also argues that the missing testimony is 
necessary to identify any other possible errors at 
trial. However, a defendant is not entitled to a new 
trial whenever a gap in the record exists just in case 
the gap ma) contain some error. See State v. Russell, 
917 P.2d 557. 559 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Gardner 
overstates Russell as mandating teversal where a 
record is incomplete. In fact, Russell held that an 
incomplete record does not on its own require a new 
trial. See id. The court noted that Utah law "does 
not require a complete record so appellate counsel 
can go fishing for error; it only requires that there 
be a record adequate to review specific claims of 
error already raised." Id. 
Gardner also asserts that the trial court erred in 
giving an instruction regarding the elements of 
entrapment. When challenging jur\ instructions on 
appeal, an appellant "cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that [appellant] led 
the trial court into committing the error" State v 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, % 9, 86 P.3d 742 
(quotations and citation omitted). As a result, a jury 
instruction ma\ not be assigned as error " 'if 
counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no 
objection to the jury instruction/' * Id (quoting 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, <|[ 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
Counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court 
that he had no objection to the specific instruction 
now appealed. Thus, Gardner is precluded from 
challenging this instruction on appeal. 
*3 Accordingly, Gardner's conviction is affirmed. 
Utah App.,2006. 
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ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition i;"ox writ o.l 
certiorari, filed on March 27, 2006, 
T 18 HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to RUJ 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition 
trained as to the foiiowinq issue: 
>r w tiorari 
Whether due process necessitated review of the cross-
examination testimony of one of the State's witness, where 
Petitioner claimed entrapment, the recorded transcript does not 
include the cross-examination testimony, and the court of appeals 
did not address the district court's proposed reconstruction of 
that testimony. . 
A briefing schedule will be established hereofter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
11s issuance. 
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